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1. Introduction
Like any family, the Carolingian dynasty which ruled continental Western Europe from
the mid-eighth century until the end of the ninth had its black sheep. Lothar II (855-69)
was perhaps the most tragic example. A great-grandson of the famous emperor
Charlemagne, he belonged to a populous generation of the family which ruled the
Frankish empire after it was divided into three kingdoms – east, west and middle – by the
Treaty of Verdun in 843. In 855 Lothar inherited the northern third of the Middle
Kingdom, roughly comprising territories between the Meuse and the Rhine, and seemed
well placed to establish himself as a father to the next generation of Carolingians. But his
line was not to prosper. Early in his reign he had married a noblewoman called
Theutberga in order to make an alliance with her family, but a few childless years later
attempted to divorce her in order to marry a former lover called Waldrada by whom he
already had a son. This was to be Lothar’s downfall, as his uncles Charles the Bald and
Louis the German, kings respectively of west and east Francia, enlisted the help of Pope
Nicholas I in order to keep him married and childless, and thus render his kingdom
vulnerable to their ambitions. In this they were ultimately successful – by the time he
died in 869, aged only 34, Lothar’s divorce had become a full-blown imperial drama
played out through an exhausting cycle of litigation and posturing which dominated
Frankish politics throughout the 860s.1 In the absence of a legitimate heir to take it over,
his kingdom was divided between those of his uncles – and with the exception of a short
period in the 890s, it never truly existed again as an independent kingdom.
Like many other transient polities before and after, Lothar’s realm should by rights have
been swallowed up by the ever-shifting plates of European political history, never to be
seen again. But, remarkably, this did not happen. Although it was divided again and
again between neighbouring kingdoms (seven times already by 880), the unfortunate
king’s name somehow stuck to the region he had ruled, first as ‘Lothar’s kingdom’
(‘regnum Lotharii’), and from the middle of the tenth century – by which time it had
become a duchy of the east Frankish kingdom – as ‘Lotharingia’.2 The name is fossilised
today in the French administrative region Lorraine (German: Lothringen). As part of
Alsace-Lorraine this region has played a famous role in modern European history as a
‘victory trophy’ in Franco-German conflicts since the early modern period, and especially
since 1871.3 Lothar II’s spectre was explicitly resurrected in the wartime deliberations of
the politicians who would go on to shape the European Union: the French government in
exile in Algiers discussed Lotharingia as a potential historical reference point for a post-
war European order embracing the contiguous heartlands of France, Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and, later, Germany.4 In the end Charlemagne was
preferred as the symbolic ‘father of Europe’, to appeal to a more conventional and better-
known narrative of European origins.5 Lothar thus retreated back into the shadow of his
illustrious ancestor, though not into total obscurity: the so-called ‘Great Region’ set up in
the 1970s and centred on Luxembourg, Lorraine and the Saarland also revived memories
of the early medieval past – a competition to find a name for the region held in 2002
included ‘Lotharingia’ on the shortlist.6 Alas, it did not win – Lothar II, tormented by
popes and uncles while he lived, was thwarted once again by posterity.
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version of European political organisation were prompted by the industrial significance
of the region, particularly its coal and steel production. This economic importance was
nothing new. The region’s broad rivers, central location, healthy agricultural productivity
and population density meant it had a consistent role in the big picture of European
history, and it has been argued that these factors exerted a gravitational force on the
shapes of Philip the Good’s Burgundy, Napoleon’s empire, and the so-called ‘Blue
Banana’ of modern economic geographers.7 In the Middle Ages its logistical and
economic centrality was also translated into cultural attitudes which found expression in
notions of ‘heartland and border’, as Robert Bartlett has shown.8 A case could therefore
be made that Lotharingia has in a sense always existed, as a recurrent product of the
interchange between human activity and European geography – and that Lothar’s
kingdom was thus simply one manifestation of a deeper-rooted historical reality.
But neither modern reinventions of Lotharingia as a historical entity, nor the possibility
of longue durée currents holding it together under the surface, can obscure the fact that
the political history of the region, on which this article concentrates, was highly
discontinuous. This is part of what makes it so interesting, and why it has attracted such
a vast quantity of scholarly attention: in 1833 E. Bégin estimated that there were already
around 1,200 titles on the topic, and that was over sixty years before the appearance of
what is today regarded as the seminal work by Robert Parisot, which has in turn inspired
several generations of further studies.9 Lotharingian history also has a dedicated book
series, the ‘Journées Lotharingiennes’, established in the 1980s as a means of positioning
the history of Luxembourg in an international context.10 Still, the bewildering array of
scholarship on the middle Frankish kingdom does carry less historiographical baggage
than the eastern and western Frankish kingdoms, which have often been seen as
prototypes for France and Germany.11 Since we know it had no future as a nation-state,
the middle kingdom is perhaps easier for us to examine as an artefact of its own time.
Lotharingia, then, is a useful lens through which we can try to observe the confusing and
contested politics of the late- and post-Carolingian age in the ninth and tenth centuries – a
period which witnessed the end of the age of great European empires and the beginnings
of medieval Europe.12 We will first survey the history of Lotharingia’s relations with its
neighbours; and then look at questions of authority and identity within the region itself.
2. Between east and west: what was Lotharingia?
The easiest way to describe the boundaries of Lothar II’s kingdom is in terms of rivers: to
the east it was bounded by the Rhine and to the west by the Scheldt and the Meuse. Its
southern frontier abutted Burgundy. But nature did as much to interrupt as to confirm the
kingdom’s definition – the hills and forests of the Ardennes, for instance, divided its
northern (‘Lower’) and southern (‘Upper’) parts. Ecclesiastical and secular definitions of
territory breached the rivers on both sides – thus the dioceses of Toul and Verdun
extended west of the Meuse, while some counties stretched east of the lower Rhine.13
The human boundaries shifted constantly as pieces were added to and removed from the
kingdom by the vagaries of political circumstance. Nor did its shape correspond to
obvious cultural frontiers – the Romance/Germanic linguistic split ran through
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regnal division that created Lothar’s kingdom was the fair division of resources between
members of the Carolingian family. Coal and steel lay in the future, but in contemporary
terms the region’s economic resources were considerable. Dorestad, which lay in Frisia
near the mouth of the Rhine, was a major trading node of the Carolingian period and
although it was on the wane by the later ninth century we know that Frisia remained an
important North Sea trading centre in the tenth and eleventh centuries.15 The decline of
Dorestad was linked to the rise of new trading hubs further up-river, not least among
them Verdun on the Meuse, a long-standing commercial centre which contemporary
observers linked with long-distance slave trading to the Mediterranean littoral.16 More
mundane commodities included the agricultural surpluses produced by the kingdom’s
large and land-rich monasteries such as Prüm.17 The increase in our period in the size of
the marketplace at Cologne, revealed by archaeology, implies that the regional circulation
of goods was an increasingly important feature of Lotharingian life in the later ninth and
tenth centuries.18
The region’s ruling families certainly benefited from such activity. An example of this is
the incipient and expensive trend of aristocratic strongholds built in stone referred to in
tenth-century sources.19 Alpert of Metz, writing in the early 1020s, describes an
aristocratic dispute in which the superior wealth of one party was due to his holding more
lands than his rival on the left of the Rhine – the implication being both that he had
access to the river’s commerce, and that land in ‘Gallia’ (Lotharingia) was somehow
more valuable than land in ‘Germania’.20 Economic vitality did not necessarily lead to
political stability – Alpert’s story clearly shows that resources were a focus of conflict as
well as a source of wealth. Similarly, early medieval kings did not always find it easy to
benefit directly from their kingdoms’ wealth: in 856 Lothar II claimed that the
‘diminution of the kingdom’ had forced his father to take lands from the church.21 But
while Lotharingia was relatively small by Carolingian standards, it did have a spectacular
concentration of political resources which its rulers could seek to manipulate, including
two archbishoprics, eight bishoprics and numerous imperial monasteries which served as
centres of wealth, commemoration and elite socialisation. Among them were several
archetypal dynastic centres like Aachen, the site of Charlemagne’s most famous palace,
and Metz, the final resting place of Lothar’s grandfather Louis the Pious and of Bishop
Arnulf, the legendary progenitor of the Carolingians. Little wonder that in the thirteenth
century Lotharingia could be referred to as ‘patria regum’: homeland of kings.22
These potent royal sites were a major reason why control of Lotharingia became such a
driving ambition for the kings of east and west Francia after the middle of the ninth
century.23 Lothar II’s death in 869 flipped the cold-war posturing of the previous decade
over into open confrontation between his uncles: Charles the Bald marched to Metz and
had himself crowned in September, though soon afterwards he was forced to back down
when his brother Louis the German threatened military action of his own. The outcome
was the Treaty of Meersen of 870, which divided Lotharingia into east and west, each
part apparently dissolved into its large neighbours on either side. Charles tried to push
his frontier eastwards after his brother’s death in 876, but a decisive victory won by Louis
the Younger, Louis the German’s son, confirmed the Meersen geography. Another
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Frankish kingdom of Louis the Younger in the Treaty of Ribemont (880), though there is
some evidence that at times it was still seen as an area of joint responsibility between the
parties.24 However, the premature deaths of eight rulers between 875 and 884 rendered
any such agreements moot, and left Charles III ‘the Fat’ to rule the empire alone. It was a
task he was not up to, and when he was deposed in late 887, to die a few weeks later in
January 888, he left behind no legitimate heirs. Devoid of adult male Carolingians to rule
it, the Carolingian Empire splintered and control of its constituent kingdoms was taken up
by kings from powerful aristocratic families. Crucially, though, these new rulers were
not related to each other, and (as contemporaries noted) none of them was strong enough
to dominate the others.25 The familial and ideological glue which had held it together
was thus gone, and the Carolingian Empire de facto ceased to exist.26
Lotharingia remained part of the east Frankish kingdom, ruled by the most powerful of
the new kings, Arnulf, an illegitimate grandson of Louis the German, whose control was
confirmed in 892 at the River Dyle (in northern Lotharingia) by a famous victory over
Scandinavian armies. But despite this successful early foray into the northwest of his
realm Arnulf’s power-base was in Carinthia, far from the old royal heartlands of the
Carolingians, and his imperial ambitions meant that he was more interested in Italy than
in the north and west of his kingdom. His influence in Lotharingia became vulnerable to
the raids of Charles ‘the Straightforward’ (or ‘Simple’), a grandson of Charles the Bald
who had been passed over in 888 on account of his youth, and by murderous conflicts
between local aristocratic families. He sought to stabilise the situation in 895 by
installing his son Zwentibald as king – the only man apart from Lothar II to rule
Lotharingia as a kingdom – but the factionalisation of local politics meant that he was
unable to rule effectively and gained a reputation for unpredictability and instability.27 In
900, Zwentibald himself was killed in a conflict with aristocratic rivals. His half-brother
Louis the Child, king of east Francia, then took over. When Louis died, childless, in 911,
aged only 18, Arnulf’s line was extinguished, and with it the last vestiges of Carolingian
authority in east Francia: ‘the royal line’, as one mid-tenth century observer put it, ‘had
now failed’.28
Either slightly before or immediately after Louis died, ‘the Lotharingians’, as some
contemporaries had now begun to call them, transferred their allegiance to Charles the
Straightforward, who had become king of west Francia in 898. Charles lacked the
resources of his Carolingian ancestors and could not rule like them, and by way of
compensation he took every opportunity to assert the prestige of his family background:
but it was only after he took over Lotharingia, with its distinctive royal topography, that
he felt able to adopt Charlemagne’s hegemonic title ‘rex Francorum’ (‘king of the
Franks’).29 Charles also worked hard to integrate Lotharingia into his west Frankish
kingdom, using the connections afforded by his Lotharingian wife Frederun to make
alliances with important aristocratic figures there, and seeking to influence episcopal
appointments.30 In 921 the new king of east Francia, Henry I (first ruler of the Ottonian
dynasty), met Charles at Bonn, thus tacitly confirming that the Rhine was the frontier
between their kingdoms and that Lotharingia belonged to the west. However, Charles’s
keen interest in Lotharingia seems to have been one of the reasons that leading west
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he died in 929. By then, in 925, ‘the Lotharingians’ had transferred allegiance again, to
the eastern kingdom of Henry I, who sought to cement the alliance by marrying his
daughter Gerberga to the leading magnate in the middle kingdom, Giselbert.31 This time
the switch was permanent: it would be another seven centuries before Lotharingia (or at
least the southern half which became Lorraine) was ruled again from France.
Nonetheless, we should be careful not to let hindsight obscure our view: as Joachim
Ehlers has stated, the struggle for Lotharingia remained the central issue in tenth-century
dynastic politics even after 925.32 A major rebellion against Otto I shortly after his
accession in 936 involved the leading magnates of Lotharingia, and led to an invasion by
Louis IV, Charles the Straightforward’s son and successor. Although Otto prevailed,
Louis then married his sister Gerberga, widow of Giselbert of Lotharingia: their first son,
born in 941, was pointedly named Lothar. Like his father, Louis IV faced severe
opposition inside his kingdom, so his expansionary ambitions were never realised. Still,
the intermediaries installed by Otto as dukes in the region did not have things their own
way, and the second major rebellion against the king, in 953-4, again centred on
Lotharingia.33 Gerberga and Lothar’s public renunciation of their Lotharingia aspirations
in 959 arguably represented a continuation rather than a cessation of the struggle for the
middle kingdom, as it served equally as an open declaration that they nurtured claims to a
territory which had never really been theirs.34 Hot conflict flared again in 978, when
Lothar took Aachen and briefly held it – Richer of Rheims says that he turned the eagle
on roof of the palace to point east, symbolising his claims to Lotharingia as a whole –
before Otto II reversed his losses with a massive retaliatory raid.35 The two kings made
peace just east of the Meuse in 980 – significantly, a long way west from where Charles
the Straightforward and Henry I had met in 921. Upon Otto II’s death in 983 Lothar tried
his luck again, capturing various Lotharingian magnates, taking the great commercial
centre of Verdun, and holding it for over a year.
This phase of conflict came to an end with Lothar’s death in 986 and that of his son Louis
V a year later. The next west Frankish king, Hugh Capet, was from a new dynasty and
although his family – the Capetians – did retain a residual claim to Lotharingia which
was occasionally backed with force, they did not pursue it with as much vigour as their
predecessors. The accession of the Capetians gave Hugh’s contemporary Otto III an
opportunity to assert control of Lotharingia and its Carolingian heritage with much more
confidence than previous Ottonian kings.36 There is also a sense in west Frankish texts of
the earlier eleventh century that Lotharingia had been lost – that west Frankish
aspirations there were real, but lay in a regretted past rather than a realisable future.37
This does not mean that subsequent east Frankish kings had it all their own way – both
Henry II (1002-24) and Conrad II (1024-39) had to resort to military force to establish
their right to rule in Lotharingia against local opposition.38 However, it is arguably the
case that the mid-eleventh century marked the end of its formal history, and of the pattern
of tug-of-war politics initiated by the reign of Lothar II: then it was that the duchy was
definitively divided into northern (Lower) and southern (Upper) halves.39
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of its history from its beginnings in the mid-ninth century until at least the end of the
tenth. However, it would be a mistake to see in this pattern (as many have done) an
expression of primordial Franco-German rivalry, foreshadowing modern disputes over
Alsace-Lorraine. Instead, we need to understand it as a product of contemporary political
circumstances, especially those pertaining after the end of the Carolingian monopoly on
royal power in 888. None of the kings who ruled after this date, even those descended
from the ninth-century Carolingians, could expect to have their legitimacy accepted as a
matter of course. They had to compete not just to dominate their rivals, but even to
establish the very notion of their own regality. In this struggle for legitimacy, attempts to
appropriate the symbolic capital of Lotharingia’s Carolingian past played an important
role. Otto I, for example, sought to enhance his family’s prestige by furnishing their
main religious houses with relics from Carolingian churches in the middle kingdom such
as Maastricht and Cambrai.40 Likewise, Charlemagne’s palace and chapel at Aachen
were ostentatiously imitated by rulers seeking to buy into its history by association, and
to divert its glamour towards distant regions such as Saxony, Alsace and Flanders.41
Such symbolic one-upmanship reflected the fact that the heartlands of the tenth-century
dynasties were far from the core territories of the old Carolingian Empire: Charles the
Straightforward and his descendants lacked authority beyond Laon and Rheims, the
Capetians were based in Tours and Paris, while the Ottonian heartlands were in Saxony
and (after 1002) Bavaria. Lotharingia was thus simultaneously central in
political/cultural terms and peripheral in a geographical sense. This paradox fuelled
conflict over the kingdom, its physical unattainability making it hard to definitively
control and causing its symbolic significance to inflate.42 Yet the resulting conflict also
provided repeated opportunities to define, classify and therefore assert the region’s
identity as a region. The intensity of the struggle for Lotharingia between its neighbours,
each operating at the fingertips of their reach, was what burned its shadow onto the map
of Europe.
3. Identity and authority
Lotharingia figures prominently not just in discussions about interaction between the
Frankish kingdoms, but also in a set of debates about identity and authority within them.
These debates, which have long dominated German historiography on tenth-century
political history, are prompted by the emergence in the post-Carolingian kingdoms of
sub-regnal units called duchies or principalities. Arguments about the character of the
duchies have turned on two issues in particular: were they in any sense ‘ethnic’
communities, or were they administrative units produced by Carolingian politics? and
how did the ‘dukes’ mediate between duchy and king – as autonomous leaders of the
former, or appointed representatives of the latter? These questions feed in different ways
into the master narratives of French, German and Italian history, and much of the modern
historiography on the topic deals explicitly or implicitly with the origins of modern
nations.43 Although it does not fit conveniently into these national narratives, assertions
about the coherence or otherwise of the Lotharingian duchy have nonetheless been
influenced by the political prejudices of the twentieth.44 Also at stake here are competing
models of Europe’s transition from the post-Roman age of large empires to a Middle
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lordship and the domination of the peasantry through coercion and violence. Some
historians place this transformation in a ‘Feudal Revolution’ in the decades around 1000,
while others argue that the change was much slower, or even that there was not much
change at all.45 Although evaluation of this debate is beyond the scope of the present
article, we should note that the evidence for Lotharingian ducal power and collective
identity has played an integral role in its unfolding.46
That evidence is so interesting and contested in part because it is fragmented and hard to
understand. In contrast to the rich annalistic tradition of the Carolingian era, the first half
of the tenth century produced few extended narrative sources. The situation improves
after 950, but we are forced to look at Lotharingia primarily through the eyes of authors
based in east and west Francia. The longer-form texts we do have are mainly
hagiographical, telling sacred histories of monasteries and bishoprics rather than
recounting events in the kingdom as a whole. As Theo Riches has recently argued, this
pattern of evidence can be interpreted as a historical fact in itself – uncertainty about the
political centre meant that major churches became the main focuses of institutional
memory, preserving and re-framing elements of Carolingian political culture in a
completely new environment.47 Otherwise, we can turn to a large body of royal and non-
royal charters – documents recording gifts of property and privilege to individual
churches, which often include crucial nuggets of information about the geographies and
idioms of political power. Inferences about ducal authority and collective identity have
to be sifted carefully from such material. The problem is not so much a lack of evidence
per se as a lack of agreement about what kind of picture the finished jigsaw should reveal
– or even about how many different jigsaws we should be trying to make.48 However, the
linked questions of authority and identity undoubtedly do take us to the heart of some
distinctive features of tenth-century Europe.
Firstly, who were the dukes and how should we understand their role? The Latin title dux
simply means ‘leader’. The ninth-century Carolingians were careful only to use it in
military contexts and never to designate a regular office or role – for them, the term
carried uncomfortable echoes of the powerful rivals they had had to overcome during
their rise to power in the eighth century. The post-888 usage was different, as revealed
by an early example in a charter of Louis the Child from 903, in which the powerful
aristocrat Gebhard is described as ‘dux of the kingdom which many call Lothar’s’.49 One
reading of this would be that Gebhard was the king’s formally-appointed representative
in Lotharingia. Certainly, several other powerful figures were referred to as dux in the
area in the course of the tenth century, and only ever one at a time. Some at least are
reported to have been installed by the Ottonians. In 953, for example, Flodoard of
Rheims states that Otto I ‘removed Conrad [the Red] from the duchy of Lotharingia’ after
a rebellion and replaced him with his own brother, archbishop Brun of Cologne.50
Sources from the end of our period are even more emphatic about the formality of the
ducal role: thus, for instance, the late-eleventh century ‘Translation of St Servatius’
describes Giselbert (d. 939) as ruling Lotharingia ‘on behalf of the emperor’.51
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misleading. In an important book published in 1977 Hans-Werner Goetz powerfully
attacked the old view of the post-Carolingian dukes as intermediary officials,
emphasising that their reach was often limited within their supposed spheres of influence,
and that their interests also extended beyond the frontiers of the ‘duchies’ – that they
were not a completely new phenomenon so much as repackaged versions of ninth-century
‘imperial aristocrats’.52 What’s more, these men were not titled ‘dux’ consistently, and
were just as likely to be referred to by contemporaries as ‘comes’ (count) or ‘marchio’
(powerful count). More recent studies by Rüdiger Barth and Jens Schneider have taken
an equally sceptical view with regard to Lotharingia in particular.53 Nonetheless, in
scholarship on this period the tacit assumption persists that the equation of duke and
duchy was a straightforward and fundamental building block of the post-Carolingian
world.
Posed in such stark terms, there is no simple way to resolve this question – the formality
or otherwise of the ducal ‘office’ will depend on the assumptions one brings to the
question. But more nuanced insights have been gained by looking at what these ducal
figures actually did, and by focusing on the differences between them rather than trying
to isolate what they had in common. Giselbert was arguably the most powerful of the
Lotharingian dukes. It has been argued that he may even have sought to have himself
crowned king in 920: the issue turns on Flodoard’s use of the unusual term ‘princeps’,
and the weight of opinion is currently against. However, his career underlines the
extreme fluidity of political hierarchies in the earlier part of the century. He was
influential enough to bring the loyalty of ‘the Lotharingians’ to Henry I in 925, and the
king recognised his status by giving the hand of his daughter Gerberga in 928 and
consistently referring to him as ‘dux’ thereafter. A charter of 934 calls Giselbert and his
associates ‘leaders of Lothar’s kingdom’.54 What he hoped to gain from his rebellion
against Otto I in 938-9 we can only guess, though his death in the course of it was a great
relief to the king and the campaign of damnatio memoriae to which his reputation was
then subjected implies that he was considered a formidable rival.55 Giselbert is also one
of the few leaders of northern Lotharingia who is known to have had some influence in
the south, at the important nunnery of Remiremont.56 But even Giselbert did not have it
all his own way. He had rivals in the south, such as the powerful Count Boso whose
resistance to the duke’s ambitions is described in the Life of John of Gorze.57 When we
examine Giselbert’s career closely, he looks like an unusually powerful factional leader
whose evident influence was based on a range of factors, including his family’s historic
standing, his ability to play the eastern and western kings against each other, and his
control of a network of reformed monasteries through which political power could be
projected.58 His ‘ducal’ status was not an independently-defined official position, but
another aspect of his political persona – we might well say that he was duke because he
was powerful, rather than the other way round.
From the late 940s it does look as if Otto I attempted to formalise the notion that dukes
were appointed by the king, and simultaneously sought to keep them close by installing
men who were closely related to him by blood or marriage. But this does not seem to
have done much for his son-in-law Conrad ‘the Red’, whose attempts in the early 950s to
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indigenous magnates refused to do his bidding, driving him into rebellion and a desperate
alliance with pagan Hungarian mercenaries. Even Otto’s brother Brun of Cologne
struggled to impose himself as dux, facing severe opposition not just from his sister
Gerberga, but also from local potentates such as Reginar III, Giselbert’s nephew.59 A
text written in Utrecht during his lifetime even seems to reject the notion of allegiance to
the Ottonians altogether.60
By the later tenth century there are signs that the balance of powers was stabilising. By
1000 the aristocratic families who controlled the main political offices and resources in
southern Lotharingia (notably the family known to historians as the ‘Ardenner’) were
those who would continue to do so for some centuries.61 By the 980s we even find a
woman (Beatrice, widow of Duke Frederick) holding the masculine title dux, which
implies that the position had been reified and depersonalised to some degree.62 And the
Miracles of St Gorgonius, written at Gorze in the 980s, includes a passage which implies
that the duke was perceived as responsible by virtue of his position for the protection of
monasteries he did not control personally (though the point of the story is to criticise him
for not doing so).63 But we also find in the Chronicle of St-Mihiel, 50 years later, a duke
forcibly appropriating an important Lotharingian monastery because it was ‘far from
royal authority’.64 Even in the mid-eleventh century the factional and formal identities of
the dukes, their official and aristocratic personas, could still be perceived as inseparable.
Such caveats about the coherence and consistency of ducal office also have implications
for the other part of the debate on the duchies, namely the definitions of the community
over which they were said to rule. The idioms of political power in the early Middle
Ages drew heavily on ethnic discourses – thus the ninth-century Carolingian kings were
often defined as ‘kings of the Franks’. Kings were generally loathe to endow the
analogous prestige of an ethnic qualifier on the tenth-century dukes – Giselbert was only
once called ‘duke of the Lotharingians’ in a royal charter, which was issued at the
beginning of Otto I’s reign when he was desperate to curry favour.65 The commonly-
used expression for the region in the later ninth century was, as we noted at the
beginning, ‘regnum Lotharii’ – Lothar’s kingdom. The term ‘Lotharingians’ does not
appear before the second decade of the tenth century; and for the first use of
‘Lotharingia’ we have to wait until Liudprand of Cremona’s Book of Retribution, written
at the end of the 950s.66 The historians of Otto I’s reign were the first to ascribe
characteristics to the Lotharingians: Widukind of Corvey, for example, wrote that they
were ‘a skilful people, accustomed to ingenuity and ready for warfare’.67 This is a
curious evolution – as Tim Reuter pointed out, it was unusual for a people to be named
after their king, rather than the other way round.68 The question of what was meant by
these terms for the territory and the people who lived there has thus proved enduringly
controversial.
For some historians it is axiomatic that Lotharingia (and the Lotharingians) had a
continuous history from the time of Lothar II onwards, not least because the ‘regnum
Lotharii’ is referred to fairly regularly by late ninth-century authors even when it was
divided. The presumption that a persistent sense of regnal coherence lay behind such
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terminology has led to its use as an explanation for key moments in political history.
Thus it has been suggested that the failed rebellion of Hugh, Lothar II’s son, who sought
to regain the ‘paternal kingdom’ in 883, was backed by aristocrats who had a stake in and
residual loyalty to a reconstituted Lotharingia.69 Similarly, Zwentibald is sometimes
thought to have cemented the notion of Lotharingian identity inadvertently, by uniting the
region’s nobles against him. Various mechanisms and forums have been adduced by
which such an identity might have been fostered and transmitted, among them the
numerous gatherings of Lothar’s bishops during his divorce case; the regular meetings of
Carolingian kings in the middle kingdom in the later ninth century; and the maintenance
of a separate ‘chancery’ network and distinct royal titulature by kings either side of 900.70
Thomas Bauer has gone further, arguing that Lotharingia constituted a distinctive cultural
space even in the longue durée, defined not just by political structures but also by
particular forms of religious devotion.71
But, at the moment, the balance of opinion seems to be against such a view. Stuart Airlie
has recently argued, convincingly, that Lothar II was not a cause célèbre so much as an
embarrassment to his bishops and aristocrats.72 This was still the case for Regino of
Prüm, the great Lotharingian chronicler of the late Carolingian age, who does not so
much as acknowledge the idea of a Lotharingian regnal identity and has nothing good to
say about either of the Lotharingian kings, Lothar II and Zwentibald.73 Taking issue with
Bauer’s thesis, Jens Schneider and Michel Margue have argued strongly that the
mechanisms one would need to sustain a continuous sense of political togetherness
(including a stable political centre, central places, rituals and regalia symbolizing
rulership, a clear definition of space, a sense of shared history) were all but completely
lacking in the ninth and tenth centuries.74 Lotharingian history was rewritten, or even
created, only by the episcopal ideologues of the eleventh century – at precisely the point
when the unified duchy ceased to exist.75
It might be said that these arguments ‘against’ seem strong because deconstructing
Lotharingian identity is easier than describing it – the evidence lends itself more readily
to being pulled apart than drawn together. Whether or not that is the case, historians’
positions on the coherence or otherwise of a Lotharingian regnal community are clearly
very polarised. But when asking ourselves whether this particular glass is half-full or
half-empty, we should also ask what we mean by the ‘identity’ we are trying to locate.
Above all, we need to be wary of exporting modern notions of nationality and belonging:
early medieval concepts of ethnicity, unlike our own, were tacitly but deeply influenced
by biblical discourses about conversion and salvation.76 Moreover, ethnic labels could be
relational – the surfacing of the usage ‘kingdom of the Teutons’ for east Francia in the
late tenth century was a response to the Ottonians’ incorporation of Italy into their realm;
and likewise the emergence of ‘Lotharingia’ and ‘Lotharingians’ coincides with the
increasing restriction of the ubiquitous ninth-century label ‘Francia’ to the royal
heartlands of west Francia.77 Such shifts suggest that ethnic labels did not necessarily
correlate straightforwardly to communities of feeling – ethnic classification was (and is)
an aspect of political discourse, and was sometimes used by contemporaries in pointed,
rhetorical ways.78 Beyond the long-running debate about the existence or otherwise of
Lotharingia as a cultural space and imagined community, this evidence may therefore
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still have something useful to tell us about the fragmentation of Carolingian political
order and its reconstitution in the new idioms of the post-Carolingian era.
4. Conclusion
The political history of Lotharingia in the ninth and tenth centuries was sui generis – its
‘in-between’ geographical position combined with its rich political traditions made it an
object of desire for rulers near and far, and the interplay between them created the
fragmented history we have considered in this article. But in other ways, the problems of
understanding Lotharingian history give us useful general insights into the late- and post-
Carolingian world. Its obvious constructedness and discontinuousness, its provisional
character, should serve as a cautionary tale for anyone studying the early history of its
neighbouring kingdoms, which later became France and Germany. That such an artificial
and provisional political unit as Lotharingia, whose boundaries were defined by
immediate political circumstances rather than any deep-rooted cultural or geographical
factors, could become within a few generations the home of a ‘people’ to whom national
characteristics were ascribed is generally seen as a surprising feature which demands
explanation. But maybe this is looking at the picture in negative. If we suppose that
Lotharingia’s course of development was representative of early medieval politics, rather
than odd, we are compelled to confront some of the tacit assumptions habitually made
about the origins of other European nations. There is no reason to think that
Lotharingia’s historical cul-de-sac was inevitable, nor that the same fate could not have
befallen instead its more familiar-looking neighbours. All these political units were in a
state of constant change, their boundaries and their identities subject to a process of
perpetual reinvention. This makes the origins of Europe much less certain and much
more interesting. In this context, the idea that Lothar II’s kingdom was somehow a
forerunner of a post-national European Union is no more implausible than the idea that
Charles the Bald and Louis the German were the first kings of France and Germany.79
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